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Abstract 
Increasing demand for commercial and residential properties has caused increase in rental 
values while the Government has intervened through enactment of the Rent Control and 
Recovery of Residential Premises (RCRRP) Edict (1997). This paper examined the effects of 
the law on residential property values in the study area. In doing so, a process of inference to 
evaluate the law was adopted, in addition to multiple-samples comparison and analysis of 
variance of the controlled and open market rents. Furthermore, hypothetical design of three-
bedroom flats was used to illustrate the valuation of residential properties under the RCRRP 
Edict. The study found that with alpha level set at 0.05, rent control has no statistically 
significant effect on rental values, P-value=0.0009. It recommended that Government should 
not regulate the real estate market but provide enabling environment for investors to provide 
low cost housing units that would in the long run reduce rental values.  
 
Keywords: Intervention, property market, property tax, rent control, real estate, market 
regulation 
 
Introduction 
According to Tucker (1997), standard supply-and-demand theory shows that when the 
government fixes prices, a gap opens up between supply and demand. This is usually 
illustrated by two opposing curves, representing the "marginal propensity to sell" (supply) 
and the "marginal propensity to buy" (demand). Consumers, of course, are inclined to buy 
more as prices fall and less as prices rise; while sellers act in an opposite manner, offering 
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more as prices rise and less as prices fall until a "market-clearing price" is reached. The 
market-clearing price is the point at which, given current economic circumstances, the desires 
of both groups are optimized.         
 Furthermore, prices do not automatically come to rest at some market-clearing level 
but a continuing discovery process occurs and buyer or seller may accept a price due to a 
number of factors, namely, parties may achieve a temporary monopoly due to geography or 
other circumstances; lack of information may cause either buyers or sellers to accept a price 
that is unfavorable to them; or the actions of buyers and sellers may push prices toward a 
market-clearing level where there is lack of government interference through rent control and 
other approaches that different governments across the world have adopted. This includes one 
or more of land use restriction, including zoning, density and residential social mix, rent 
control, and land use charge or property tax; and in the words of Carter (2001), “there are few 
issues in housing and public policy in general that generate more vitriolic debate than rent 
controls”. This is because rental housing accounts for more than a third of most tenants' 
income and rent controls are a very sensitive issue for the renting public.   
 Rent control is the standard ceiling placed on the rate that a landlord can charge while 
allowing a landlord to set the rent freely when letting to a new tenant but subject to the 
tenant’s right not to accept and preventing the landlord from raising the rent or ejecting the 
tenant (Basu and Emerson, 2003). Compared with other government-mandated price controls, 
it is the law placing maximum price on what landlords may charge tenants and usually set 
below that which would have otherwise prevailed (Block and Edgar Olsen, 1981); while it 
sometimes functions as price ceiling and a collection of laws regulating how much a landlord 
can raise or must reduce the rent, and limiting the reasons for eviction, working together with 
eviction protections so that the landlord does not get around a rent limit by evicting the tenant 
(Carlson, 2006).          
 The rent control is usually an intervention through measures put in place by 
government on the pretext of protecting the urban dwellers from being pushed off the open 
market in the course of securing accommodations by putting a ceiling on the maximum rent 
payable on all classes of residential properties. Such measures include legislation on rent 
control to check incessant and arbitrary increases brought about through the interplay of 
demand and supply of residential accommodation. Such demand often rises at geometric rate 
while supply rises at arithmetic rate thereby causing galloping increase in rent from year to 
year.              
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According to Oni et al (2007), prior to the advent of rent control in Lagos State, the 
Lagos urban poor and low income earners were at the mercy of shylock landlords who often 
resorted to taking court order through the back door without serving the tenants proper 
notices, called jankara judgment (in Lagos parlance), to force them out without due process 
of law. Many of the property owners increased rent on an annual basis and at high rates, 
demanding advance rent of up to two years, not minding the unsanitary conditions of such 
accommodation units. Consequently, in 1997 the then military administrator of Lagos State 
signed into law an edict, which is cited as the Rent Control and Recovery of Residential 
Premises Edict No. 6 of 1997 (also called Rent Edict) with effect from the 21st day of March 
1997. The most striking provision of the edict is the involvement of Estate Surveyors and 
Valuers in determining the standard rent payable on residential accommodation in each of the 
zones into which Lagos State has been delineated and stipulated in relations to size of room, 
number of rooms, facilities provided, and locations.       
The aim of this paper is therefore to examine the Lagos State Rent Control and 
Recovery of Residential Premises Edict No. 6 of 1997 as it relates to fixing of standard rent; 
while the objectives are to highlight the relevant provisions of the Edict, and discuss the 
statutory method of determining the standard rents while also determining if the rent control 
has effects on values of residential properties in Lagos State.   
Literature Review 
 A number of studies have posited different arguments for and against the facets of 
interventions in the real estate market. For instance, Oni (2008), Oni (2010), and Oni and 
Ajayi (2011) in determining the effects of government intervention in property market 
through the imposition of property tax on sustainable housing delivery found that government 
intervention through the imposition of statutory formula for determining the amount payable 
by property owners as land use charge was inappropriate and that high tax and penalties 
would discourage investment in new housing and maintenance of existing stock. It 
recommended a review of the law and suggested an appropriate basis of fair and equitable tax 
to ensure sustainable housing delivery and the realization of the goal of Vision 20:2020, 
which was set to make Nigeria become one of the twenty most advanced countries by year 
2020. 
Other arguments against rent control posited that the policy which was meant to assist 
poorer residents, harms far more citizens than it helps as it benefits the better-off and limits 
the freedom of all citizens. It argues further that very few moderately priced rental units are 
actually available in rent-controlled cities with most advertised units priced well above the 
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actual median rent whereas in cities without controls, moderately priced units are available. 
In many cities, controls drive out residents and businesses; as controls hold down rents for 
some units, costs for all other rental housing skyrockets; tenants in rent-controlled units fear 
moving to more desirable neighborhoods since the only units available for rent are very high-
priced (Carter, 2001). 
Keating, Teitz and Skaburskis (1998) assessed rent control from the perspectives of 
vacancy rate, shortages and hoarding, and the morality of the market. In terms of vacancy 
rate, it found thatrent control creates housing shortages with national vacancy rates being at 
or above 7% for almost 20 years; whereas cities in USA such as Dallas, Houston, and 
Phoenix where development was welcomed, have often had vacancy rates above 15%. In 
these areas, there usually is a surplus of housing rather than a shortage. Landlords commonly 
advertise "move-in specials," where rent is reduced for the first month or even where they 
pay moving expenses. In rent-controlled cities, on the other hand, vacancy rates have been 
uniformly below normal. New York City has not had a vacancy rate above 5% since World 
War II. Before giving up rent control, vacancy rate in Boston was below 4%. In rent-
controlled San Francisco, the vacancy rate is generally around 2%, and in San Jose the rate is 
1%, which is the lowest in the country. Comparable nonrent-controlled cities, such as 
Chicago, Philadelphia, San Diego, and Seattle have normal vacancy rates at or above 7%. It 
concluded that higher rates of homelessness are a manifestation of rent control; with 
individuals having difficulty in finding new apartment in rent control cities; while crowding 
is a manifestation of rent control. 
Rent control is a disease of the mind that soon becomes a disease of the market and 
those cities that resist infection by having a healthy tolerance for the rights of others are 
rewarded with a normal competitive housing market in which housing is available at every 
price level. Those cities that succumb to the disease of rent control are doomed to never-
ending, house-to-house warfare over an everdiminishing supply of unaffordable housing. It is 
more likely to harm the market and lead to lack of investment in new rental housing and 
disinvestment in the existing stock. This causes deterioration and leaves tenants worse off 
over the long run. The nature of the controls in place seem to do little harm to housing 
markets modest benefits to tenants, without solving the problems of the poor in urban 
housing markets and provision of affordable housing for the poor must be accomplished by 
other means  (Keating, Teitz and Skaburskis, 1998; Carter, 2001). 
With this at the background, a number of questions arise: What is the effect of 
property market regulation on value of residential properties in Lagos State Nigeria? Is there 
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any significant difference between the stautory rent and open market rental values in the 
study area? In resolving these questions, hypothetical three-bedroom flat was used for 
illustration since this is the unit of accommodation commonly sought after by residents in the 
study area. Also, the principles and techniques stipulated in the edict for calculating statutory 
rental value of a three-bedroom flat were expatiated. In doing so, one hypothesis was set in 
the null form to determine the relationship between statutory and open market rental values in 
the study area; the hypothesis is: “there is no significant difference between the statutory and 
open market rental values in the study area” 
The Provision of the Rent Control and Recovery of Residential Premises Edict 1997   
The Lagos State Rent Edict of 1997 is examined under its application, provisions on 
standard rent and advance rent payment, standard rent order, zoning of Lagos State, and 
standard rent table. The edict applies to residential accommodation with annual rental value 
that, as at 1996, was not more than N250, 000. The edict classified the types and categories of 
residential accommodation and zoned Lagos State into areas with fixed standard rents and 
terms of tenancy agreement applicable in such areas. It further provided that the rents 
prescribed in the edict would be the standard rents that must be payable and would only be 
reviewed upwards every three years on the order of the Military Administrator (now the 
civilian Governor) of Lagos State, and that such standard rent would be reviewed at every 
period at a rate not exceeding 20% of the standard rent prescribed in respect of each type of 
residential accommodation; while such standard rent supersedes any rent between the 
landlord and the tenant. 
Furthermore, the edict states that it would be unlawful for any landlord or his agent, to 
demand or receive rent in excess of six months from incoming tenant and the incoming tenant 
to pay in excess of six months advance rent for categories T1 and T2 and twelve months in 
respect of accommodation in categories T3 to T8 as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1: Classification of Residential Accommodation under the Rent Edict 
Class of 
property 
  T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 
Type of 
accommodati
on 
Single  
bedroom 
Room 
and 
parlour 
Single  
bedroom  
flat 
2- 
bedroom 
flat 
3-  
bedroom 
flat 
2- 
bedroom  
house 
3- 
bedroom 
semi-
detached 
house 
3- 
bedroom 
detached 
house 
Source: Rent Control and Recovery of Residential Edict, 1977 
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Similarly, for the sitting tenants, the edict stated that it would be unlawful for a 
landlord or his agent to demand or receive standard rent in excess of three months in respect 
of any form of accommodation and for sitting tenant to offer or pay a rent in excess of three 
months advance payment for any accommodation. In both cases, any person who receives or 
pays rent in excess of what is prescribed in the edict would be guilty of an offence and 
become liable to a fine of N50, 000 or six months imprisonment. The edict expressly 
provides that all landlords should issue rent payment receipt to the tenant, failure of which 
such landlord would be guilty of an offence and become liable to a fine of N2, 500 or one 
month imprisonment. The edict categorizes residential accommodation in relation to 
materials of construction into Categories A, B, C, Standard Flat, and Standard House as 
shown in Table 2.  
Table 2: Categories of Residential Accommodation under the Lagos State Rent Edict 
Category Description Accommodation Details 
A Buildings constructed of sandcrete 
blocks, bricks or mud plastered and 
painted internally and externally 
Rooms with floor area not less than 11.2m2 (or 12’ x 
10’); plus 14m2 (3.7m x 3.7m or 12’ x 12’) parlour; 
kitchen not being shared by not more than 6 rooms; 
bathroom with pipe-borne water not shared by more 
than 6 rooms; flush toilet not shared by more than 6 
rooms; minimum floor finish is cement screed; water 
and electricity supply are from the mains.  
B Buildings constructed of bricks or mud 
plastered with cement 
Standard rooms with dimensional area less than 
11.2m2 (3.7m x 3.0m or 12’ x 10’); plus parlour having 
a dimensional area not less than 14m2 (3.7m x 3.7m or 
12’ x 12’); kitchen, not shared by more than 8 rooms; 
bathroom with pipe-borne water but not shared by 
more than 8 rooms; cement screeded floor; water and 
electricity from the mains. 
C Buildings constructed of mud, bamboo, 
planks or corrugated iron sheets 
Standard rooms with dimensional area not less than 
11.2m2 (3.7m x 3.m or 12’ x 10’); parlour with 
dimensional area not less than 14m2 (3.7m x 3.7m or 
12’ x 12’); external kitchen; external pit toilet; external 
bathroom; screeded floor; at least internal wall surfaces 
plastered; electricity supply from the mains. 
Standard 
Flat 
A self-contained family residential 
accommodation, which should have 
amenities exclusively for the use of the 
tenant.  
A living room of not less than 14m2 (3.7m x 3.7m or 
12’ x 12’); plus standard rooms with dimensional area 
not less than 11.2m2  (3.7m x 3.m or 12’ x 10’); a 
kitchen; water closet flush toilet; bathroom; mains 
electricity supply; terrazzo floor finishing at the 
Living/Dining room and kitchen; p.v.c. floor finishing 
at the bedrooms. 
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Standard 
House 
Buildings on two floors for occupation 
by a single family, with sitting on the 
ground floor and bedrooms on the 
upper floor. 
Living/dining with room; standard rooms with 
dimensional area not less than 11.2m2; kitchen; store; 
water closet flush toilet on ground and first floors; 
bathroom; mains water and electricity supply; terrazzo 
flooring at the Living/dining room, kitchen, toilet and 
bathroom and stairway; p.v.c. flooring at the 
bedrooms. 
Source: Rent Control and Recovery of Residential Edict, 1977 
 
Apart from stating the categories of accommodation, the edict listed the communities 
affected by its provisions; the communities covered by the edict are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3:Zoning of Communities Affected by Provisions of the Edict 
Zone Communities 
A Lagos Island including Olowogbowo, Isale Eko, Epetedo, Sangross, Obalende, Onikan, Araromi Faji Area, 
Oke-Suna, Anikantamo, Lafiaji, Oke-Popo area, Agarawu area, Oko-Awo, Tinubu, Brazillian Quarters, 
Obadina, Ita-Eleiye area, Apongbon, Idumota, Ereko, Oto, Ido, Surulere, Ebute Meta West, Apapa, Festac 
(Medium Density) 
B Lawanson, Tejuoso, Ojuelegba, Mabo area, Yaba, Sabo, Onike, Iwaya, Akoka, Igbobi, Jibowu, Fadeyi, 
Onipanu, Palm grove, old Ilupeju, Obanikoro, Aguda, Surulere, Apakun, Papa Ajao, Oyadiran Estate, Festac 
(High Density), Ikate, Obale-Odan, Obele-Oniwahala, Games Village, Opebi LSDPC Housing Estate, 
Satellite Town, Agidingbi New Development, Onigbongbo Village, Ojodu Pilot Estate, and Gowon Estate. 
C Ikeja Division excluding places listed in other zones but including Oregun, Ojota, Ketu, Oworonsoki, 
Ijeshatedo, Kirikiri, Bariga, Somolu, Oshodi, Isolo, Egbe, Ikotun, Akowonjo, Egbeda, Idimu, Iyana-Ipaja, 
Agege, Orile-Agege, Iju, Ifako, Ijaye, Moshalashi, Otubu, Pero, Asade, Mushin, Panada, Mangoro, Onipetesi, 
Dopemu, Cement, Sanngo, Oko-Oba, Matori, Challenge, Cappa, Olorunsogo, Idi-oro,  Idi-Araba, Ilasamaja, 
Agidingbi, Papa Ashafa, Oke-Koto, Aguda-Tuntun, Ojodu Akiode, Isheri, Alakuko, Agbado, Ladilak, Abule-
Okuta, Ifako-Gbagada, Ogudu Village, Alapere, Kollinton, Onigbongbo, Adekunle Village, Ogba, Ikate, 
Osapa, Shagari Estate, Magodo Village, Shangisha Village, Itire, Iba Low Cost Housing Estate, Abaranje 
New Developments, Abule Nla, Abule Ijesha, Abule-Oja, Itire, Bolade, Ajisegiri, Ladipo, Sogunle, Alasia, 
Okota, Ishaga, Mafoluku, Ewu-tuntun, Coker Village, Iponri Low Cost Housing Estate, Amuwo-Odofin Low 
Cost Housing Estate, Ojokoro/Ijaiye Low Cost Housing Estate, Ogba Phase I, Omole Village. 
D Ilaje Village, Ajegunle, Badiya, Ijora-OlaleyeVillage, Amukoko, Ilasan, Ikota, Ajah, Addo, Orile-Iganmu, 
Oke-Odo, Iba, Ijanikin, Ikare, Mile 2, Irede, Imore, Ibeshe, Ibasa, Ijegun-Egba, Onireke Village, Ojo-Alaba, 
Maza-maza, Ilaashe, Ojo, Okokomaiko, Ajangbadi, Mebamu, Ishasi, Ojo-Igbede, Otto-Ijanikin, Amuwo, 
Agboju, Oluti, Shasha, Aboru, Bolorunpelu, Baruwa, Abule Egba, Igando, Abaranje, Ijegun Village, Ipaja, 
Abule-Oki, Surulere Tuntun, Isheri-Olofin, Ayobo, Makoko, Old Alaba, Ejigbo, Iponri, Abesan Low Cost 
Housing Estate, Sangotedo, Ikota Resettlement Scheme, Owode, Thomas Laniyan Estate, Ajegunle via 
Owode-Onirin, Badore, Okun-Ajah, Abesan 
E Ikorodu, Ipakodo, Odo-Giyan, Owutu and Igbogbo 
F Ikorodu Division excluding Districts listed in Zone E but including Majidun, Abule-Okuta, Ijede, Isiu, Ewu-
Elepe, Imota, Egbin and Agbowa, Agbowa-Ikosi, and Oruba in Epe Division 
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G Epe township 
H Other towns and villages in Epe Division including Lekki and other towns and villages in Ibeju-Lekki Local 
Government Area 
K Badagry township, Ajara, Topo 
M Other towns and villages in Badagry Division up to Seme (Nigeria-Republic of Benin Border) 
N Mende, Anthony Village, Idi-Iroko Village, New Ilupeju, Ogba Phase II, Omole Scheme, Magodo Scheme, 
Gbagada Phases I& II, Bamishile/Opebi Scheme, Wemabod Estate, Alaka Estate, Alaka Extension, Amuwo-
Odofin Scheme, Medina Estate, Atunrase Estate, Shonibare Estate, FESTAC (Medium Density), Danny 
Estate,  LSDPC Estate on Carter Street Ebute Metta, Adekunle Village (New Development) 
Source: Rent Control and Recovery of Residential Edict, 1997 
 
 Furthermore, the rents that must be paid and received respectively by tenants and 
landlords were stipulated; the rents vary according to different zones and types of residential 
properties, with rents in Zone N being the highest while lowest rents were fixed for Zone M 
as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: Standard Rent Table showing Types, Categories and Rental Values as at 1997 
Zone T1A 
 
T1B 
 
T1C 
 
T2A 
 
T2B 
 
T2C 
 
T3 
 
T4 
 
T5 
 
T6 
 
T7 
 
T8 
 A 650 585 525 1,350 1,215 1,090 1,750 2,600 3,750 5,250 8,750 10,500 
B 480 430 390 960 865 780 1,250 2,800 3,750 4,375 5,800 7,000 
C 400 360 325 880 790 710 1,125 1,875 3,000 3,375 4,500 4,875 
D 320 290 260 720 650 585 825 1,500 2,250 2,625 3,750 4,125 
E 280 250 225 560 505 455 750 1,500 1,875 2,650 3,000 3,350 
F 120 110 100 240 215 195 280 320 400 480 600 640 
G 160 145 130 320 290 260 360 400 480 560 640 720 
H 65 60 55 130 115 105 160 225 265 320 400 440 
K 320 290 260 720 650 585 1,000 1,200 1,440 2,000 2,400 2,800 
M 95 85 75 190 170 155 280 360 440 560 640 720 
N 480 430 390 960 865 780 1,875 3,000 4,500 7,000 8,750 10,500 
Source: Rent Control and Recovery of Residential Edict, 1997, pp.A59 
 
From Table 4, the standard rents that property owners are by law expected to receive 
and which the tenants are expected to pay according to the types of accommodation and 
zones in which they are located. The average statutory rents for types T1A – T1C, T2A – 
T2C and T3 to T8 were projected at 20% every three years up to end of 2011 using the 
formular 
Crv = rn-1  + (rn-1 x 20%)           … Eqn. 
1            where,                    
 Crv = Current rental value        
        rn-1 = rent at last review         
        rn-1 x 20% = rent at last review increased by 20% stipulated in the Edict. 
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The result of the application of the formular has resulted in the details of projected 
rents for each of the zones, types and categories of residential properties shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Projected Statutory and Open Market Rents According to Zones and Accommodation Types 
 
 
 
 
Zone 
Rent (per month)  
(Projected from 1997 at 20% every three years, adjusted to nearest Naira per month) 
 Type T1A-T1C 
(average)N 
T2A-T2C 
(average) N 
T3 
N 
T4 
N 
T5 
N 
T6 
N 
T7 
N 
T8 
N Year 
A 1997 (controlled rent) 587 1,828 1,750 2,600 3,750 5,250 8,750 10,500 
2011 (projected rent) 2,102 6,550 6,271 9,316 9,686 13,561 22,601   2,7122 
2011 (Open Market Rent) 6,000 13,750 18,000 22,000 30,000 36,000 80,000 120,000 
B 1997 (controlled rent) 433 1,302 1,250 2,800 3,750 4,375 5,800 7,000 
2011 (projected rent) 1,552 4,665 3,857 10,033 13,437 15,676 20,783 25,082 
2011 (Open Market Rent) 5,750 11,750 12,500 22,000 50,000 65,000 70,000 100,000 
C 1997 (controlled rent) 362 794 1,125 1,875 3,000 3,375 4,500 4,875 
2011 (projected rent) 1,297 2,845 4,031 6,719 10,750 12,093 16,124 17,468 
2011 (Open Market Rent) 3,700 4,500 7,000 9,000 12,750 13,500 20,000 25,000 
D 1997 (controlled rent) 290 652 825 1,500 2,250 2,625 3,750 4,125 
2011 (projected rent) 1,039 2,336 2,956 5,375 8,062 9,406 13,437 14,781 
2011 (Open Market Rent) 3,500 4,500 7,800 15,000 20,000 25,000 35,000 50,000 
E 1997 (controlled rent) 252 507 750 1,500 1,875 2,650 3,000 3,350 
2011 (projected rent) 903 1,817 2,687 5,375 6,719 9,496 10,750 12,004 
2011 (Open Market Rent) 2,500 4,000 5,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 15,000 20,000 
F 1997 (controlled rent) 110 217 280 320 400 480 600 640 
2011 (projected rent) 394 778 1,003 1,147 1,195 1,720 2,150 2,293 
2011 (Open Market Rent) 1,750 3,000 4,500 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 15,000 
G 1997 (controlled rent) 145 290 360 400 480 560 640 720 
2011 (projected rent) 520 1,039 1,290 1,195 1,720 2,006 2,293 2,580 
2011 (Open Market Rent) 1,500 4,000 5,000 7,000 10,000 12,000 15,000 20,000 
H 1997 (controlled rent) 60 117 160 225 265 320 400 440 
2011 (projected rent) 155 420 573 806 950 1,147 1,195 1,577 
2011 (Open Market Rent) 1,500 4,500 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 16,000 22,000 
K 1997 (controlled rent) 290 652 1,000 1,200 1,440 2,000 2,400 2,800 
2011 (projected rent) 1,039 2,336 3,583 4,300 5,160 7,166 8,600 10,033 
2011 (Open Market Rent) 1,500 3,500 6,000 7,500 9,000 9,500 12,500 15,000 
M 1997 (controlled rent) 85 172 280 360 440 560 640 720 
2011 (projected rent) 305 616 1,003 1,290 1,577 2,006 2,293 2,580 
2011 (Open Market Rent) 1,200 2,400 3,600 4,800 7,000 8,000 9,500 12,000 
N 1997 (controlled rent) 434 869 1,875 3,000 4,500 7,000 8,750 10,500 
2011 (projected rent) 1,500 3,114 6,719 10,750 16,124 25,082 22,601 27,122 
2011 (Open Market Rent) 12,000 16,000 35,000 65,000 70,000 100,000 160,000 350,000 
 In Table 5, the 1997 rents stipulated for each Zone were projected at 20% increment 
every three years up to 2011, while the open market rent in 2011 were obatained from the 
practitioners with average rents passing determined. 
Material and Method 
In attaining the stated aim and objectives an exploratory study was carried out on the 
edict. In this respect, provisions in the edict were studied for an understanding of basic 
meaning and interpretation that are devoid of legal jargons. The rents stipulated in the edict 
according to zones were compared with the open market rents obtained from a survey of the 
Estate Surveyors (real estate practitioners), and from property pages of newspapers and 
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magazines in Lagos metropolis. Data on the open market rent were obtained from one 
hundred and twenty out of three hundred and twenty-five registered firms of Estate Surveyors 
and Valuers in the study area. Questionnaires were administered in Apapa, Lagos Island, 
Lagos mainland, and Ikeja which are four administrative divisions within the Lagos 
metropolis to obtain prevailing open market rental values of the properties covered by the 
edict. Averages of the rents obtained from the firms were adopted for each type of 
accommodation units. 
For purpose of analysis, statutory rents in 1997 were reviewed at maximum rate of 
20% every three years as stipulated by the edict considering the statutory and open market 
rents as at 2011 when this study was carried out. In order to illustrate the approach for 
calculating the statutory rent, floor plans of two hypothetical three-bedroom flats assumed to 
be located in Zone N were purposively used for the illustration. The process for calculating 
statutory rent as illustrated is equally applicable to other zones and type of accommodation in 
the study area. One of the floor plans has accommodation details larger than standard space 
and the other plan has space smaller than standard the stipulated standard. 
In resolving the hypothesis that “there is no significant difference between the open 
market and statutory rents in all the zones of Lagos State”, the multiple-samples comparison 
of the independent means and analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the within and in-between 
variables were adopted. The procedure compared data in two columns of data files and 
constructed statistical tests to determine the relationship between the open market and 
statutory rents. The F-test in the ANOVA was used to determine if there was significant 
difference amongst the means by decomposing variance of the data into two components, 
namely, a between-group and within-group components at 95% level of confidence, and the 
P-value that is less than 0.05 indicated statistically significant difference between the means 
of the independent variables. 
Analysis and Discussion 
The law provided ‘rewards’ for the owners of properties with extra room sizes in form 
of addition to rent while owner were to be ‘penalized’ in form of deductions from the 
stipulated standard rents. In calculating the additional value for the extra room size or 
deduction for sizes that are below the stipulated standard, two hypothetical floor plans (Fig. 1 
and Fig. 2) were used for illustration. Fig. 1 is the plan of a three-bedroom flat with floor 
dimensions above those stipulated in the edict, while Fig. 2 shows the flat with dimensions 
less than the stipulated standard. 
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Fig.1: Floor Plan of Hypothetical Three-Bedroom Flat (with accommodation dimensions above statutory 
requirement) 
 The calculation of statutory rent of hypothetical three-bedroom flat (T5 in Zone C) 
using Fig.1 with accommodation space that is more than the standard stipulated is shown in 
Table 6. 
Table 6: Calculation of Rent of Hypothetical 3-Bedroom Flat (with space above standard size) 
S/N Amenities Statutory 
(Standard) 
Dimensions 
(A) 
Actual 
Dimension of 
Hypothetical 
flat. (B) 
 
Difference 
between 
actual and 
expected 
(B–A) 
Allowance for extra floor 
space @ 60% of unit 
rate/m2 of standard rent:       
(B–A) x N135.50/m2 
(Naira per month) 
1. Master’s Bedroom 11.2m2 29.77m2 18.57 m2 2,516.24 
2 Bedroom I 11.2m2 20.84m2 9.64 m2 1,306.22 
3 Bedroom II 11.2m2 20.84m2 9.64 m2 1,306.22 
4 Living Room/Dining 14.0m2 33.49 m2 19.49 m2 2,640.90 
5 Kitchen - - - - 
6 WC Cubicle - - - - 
7 Bath - - - - 
8 Electricity - - - - 
9 Water supply - - - - 
TOTAL 47.60 m2 104.94 m2 57.34 m2 N7,769.58 
 
From Table 6, the allowance for extra floor space was determined by multiplying the 
difference between standard (statutory) size and actual size of the accommodation details; 
and 60% of the unit rate per square metre (as stipulated in the edict) was set aside for extra 
space over the statutory standard. The unit rate per square metre was derived by dividing the 
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statutory rent for a particular type of residential property with total statutory size of 
accommodation details that make up the flat. In this case, the statutory rent for three-bedroom 
flat (T5 in Zone C) is N10, 750 (projected from the 1997 base rent). The total statutory size is 
47.60 m2 whereas the total size that actually provided by the subject property is 104.94 m2 
thus indicating 57.34 m2 extra over the standard size. The unit rate per square metre is 
therefore N10,750 ÷ 47.60 m2 which translates to N225.84/ m2 while the calculated 60% of 
unit rate allowance for extra space is therefore N135.50/ m2 (i.e. N225.84/ m2 x 0.6). This is 
then applied to each space to determine the total amount payable for the extra space. In this 
case, the total monthly rent payable for the type of property having extra space include the 
statutory rent which is N10, 750 plus the total allowance for the extra floor spaces, which is 
N7,769.58 per month. Consequently, the standard rent for the flat assumed to have been 
considered in Zone C for Type T5 is N18,519.58 (rounded up to N18, 520). 
On the other hand, Fig. 2 is a sketch floor plan of hypothetical three-bedroom flat 
with dimensions less than those stipulated by the edict. This was used to explain the process 
for calculating the standard rent and how property owners are ‘penalised’ 
 
Fig.2: Floor Plan of Hypothetical Three-Bedroom Flat (with accommodation dimensions below statutory 
requirement) 
In comparison, the standard rent for typical three-bedroom flat with floor space below 
standard size is determined as shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Calculation of Rent of Hypothetical Three-Bedroom Flat (with space below standard size) 
S/
N 
Amenities Statutory 
(Standard) 
Dimensions 
(A) 
Actual 
Dimension of 
Hypothetical flat 
(B) 
 
Difference 
between actual 
and expected  (B–
A) 
Allowance for extra 
floor space  @ 60% of 
unit rate/m2 of standard 
rent:  {(B –A) x N 
135.50/m2} 
1 Master’s 
 
11.20 m2 11.22 m2 + 0.02 m2 2.71 
2 Bedroom I 11.20 m2 9.30 m2 -  1.90 m2 (257.45) 
3 Bedroom II 11.20 m2 10.22 m2 -  0.98 m2 (132.79) 
4 Sitting 
 
14.00 m2 15.65 m2 + 1.65 m2 223.58 
5 Kitchen - - - - 
6 WC Cubicle - - - - 
7 Bath - - - - 
8 Electricity - - - - 
9 Water 
 
- - - - 
TOTAL 47.60 m2 46.39 m2 (1.21) N (163.95) 
 
From Table 7, the unit rate per square metre of the standard size is N225.84/ m2 while 
its 60% is N135.50/ m2. In case of hypothetical three-bedroom flat with floor area below 
statutory requirements, total allowance for the floor space is N-163.95 indicating that 
deduction would be made from the total statutory rent for this amount. Consequently, the 
standard rent for the flat is N10, 750 less N163.95. The monthly rent for the type of flat is 
therefore N10, 586.05 (rounded up to N10, 600) per month.  
In testing the hypothesis that “there is no significant difference between the open 
market and statutory rents in all zones of Lagos State”, the multiple-samples comparison and 
analysis of variance were carried out, while the F-test in the ANOVA returned the statistics in 
Tables 8 and 9.  
Table 8: Summary of the Multiple-samples 
S/N Sample Lable Range of values 
1 Sample 1: T1AT1C 
 
Sample 1: 33 values ranging from 60.0 to 12000.0 
2 Sample 2: T2AT2C 
 
Sample 2: 33 values ranging from 117.0 to 16000.0 
3 Sample 3: T3 
 
Sample 3: 33 values ranging from 160.0 to 35000.0 
 
4 Sample 4: T4 
 
Sample 4: 33 values ranging from 225.0 to 65000.0 
 
5 Sample 5: T5 
 
Sample 5: 33 values ranging from 265.0 to 70000.0 
 
6 Sample 6: T6 
 
Sample 6: 33 values ranging from 320.0 to 100000. 
 
7 Sample 7: T7 
 
Sample 7: 33 values ranging from 400.0 to 160000. 
 
8 Sample 8: T8 
 
Sample 8: 33 values ranging from 440.0 to 350000. 
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Table 9: Analysis of Variance Table 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
Degree of 
freedom 
Mean Square F-Ratio P-Value 
Between groups 1.85823E10 7 2.65461E9 3.66 0.0009 
Within groups 1.85548E11 256 7.24797E8   
Total (Corr.) 2.0413E11 263    
 
The ANOVA table (Table 9) decomposes the variance of the data with the F-ratio 
equals 3.66256, and since the P-value of the F-test is less than 0.05, there is a statistically 
significant difference between the means of the eight samples at the 95.0% confidence level. 
From Table 10 (See Appendix), further hypothesis testing using the sample mean = 
0.0 and sample standard deviation = 1.0; and 95% confidence interval for mean:  0.0 +/- 
0.198422   [-0.198422, 0.198422].The null hypothesis is: mean = 0.5, while the alternative 
hypothesis is mean ≠ 0.5. This analysis resulted in computed t-statistics = -5.0; P-value = 
0.00000265129.Given a sample of 100 observations with a mean of 0.0 and a standard 
deviation of 1.0, the computed t-statistic equals -5.0; and since P-value for the test is less than 
0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 95.0% confidence level.  The confidence interval 
shows that the values of mu supported by the data fall between -0.198422 and 0.198422. The 
F-ratio, which in this case equals 3.66256, is a ratio of the between-group estimate to the 
within-group estimate; and since the P-value of the F-test is less than 0.05, there is a 
statistically significant difference between the means of the eight samples at the 95.0% 
confidence level.   
Research Findings and Conclusion  
The differences in statutory and open market rents are not equal across zones in the 
study area, varying with  The overall finding of the study is that there is significant difference 
between the means of open market and statutory rents across zones in the study area. The 
statutory rent fixed on residential properties in the study area has no impact on the amount 
paid and received as rents. There is wide disparity between the open market rents and 
statutory rents in all the zones as the analysis has shown, this confirms that landlords and 
tenants are not observing the provisions of the edict as it relates to payments and receipts of 
statutory rents. 
The study finds that the edict has deliberately left out high income residential 
communities covering many areas commonly occupied by low and medium income-earners, 
while rents vary relative to locations with communities at outlying precincts of Lagos 
metropolis such as Epe, Badagry, Ikorodu, and other rural communities demarcated into 
Zones E, F, G, H, K, and M command low rental values while communities within the Lagos 
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metropolis are zoned into Zones A, B, C, D, and N with higher statutory rent fixed. By this, 
the Lagos State government had good intention of protecting low income earners and 
dwellers of the areas with high rental values in the metropolitan Lagos. The method of fixing 
the statutory rents is arbitrary and questionable. The rents for communities were probably 
fixed intuitively by civil servants that drafted the edict rather than estate surveyors and 
valuers who are trained to advice on fair rental value. The edict appears to protect the 
residents of the rural and outlying locations of the Lagos metropolis from arbitrary rent 
increases but the approach would be a disincentive to developers of the type of 
accommodation units affected by the edict. The 20% increase every three years will not be 
remunerative enough to cover the annual increase in cost of repairs, maintenance, tenement 
rates, and other outgoings. 
Restricting the landlord to ridiculously low statutory rents will rather affect the low 
income earners and urban poor that the edict aimed to protect. The landlords would always 
find ways to avoid the law by resorting to black market letting by which the rent collected 
from tenants are falsified on receipt issued by them. In the long run, it may not be attractive 
to invest in low rental properties. Governments should not control the price of goods and 
services not produced by them otherwise the investors would have recourse to the black 
market letting by which tenants pay exorbitant rents and landlords issue receipts for lower 
statutory rents. The residents of Lagos State that the edict intended to protect would be 
exposed to greater hardship and become worse off.  Rather than control rent, it would be 
expedient for government to provide enabling environment for the urban poor to own 
personal houses at truly low cost by empowering them to have access to finance without cut-
throat requirements, stringent collateral and equity contributions. It is trite that the more truly 
the low cost housing units the lower the rental values of residential properties, over the long 
run. 
The study has shown that there are significant differences amongst the statutory and 
open market rents in all the zones and categories of residential properties affected by the 
edict. Consequently, it is not reasonable to allow the edict prevails and it is therefore high 
time that it was repealed. Rather than controlling the rent of residential properties government 
in should provide the enabling environment that will truly encourage urban residents to own 
personal houses and thereby reduce the demand for the type of residential properties and 
consequently reduce the open market rent on the long run. Generally, the regulation of the 
real estate market through rent control has not achieved the expected positive effects of 
reducing rent. It is therefore advised that the investors in residential properties affected by the 
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law should be free to derive ‘un-controlled’ return for risk and uncertainty in the real estate 
market just like other investment vehicles such as stocks and shares whose price are not 
controlled. 
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